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TEACHING RACE/TEACHING WHITENESS:
TRANSFORMING COLORBLINDNESS TO
COLOR INSIGHT*
MARGALYNNE J. ARMSTRONG AND STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN"
This Article argues that whiteness operates as the normative
foundation of most discussions of race. Legal educators often
overlook the role of whiteness in the law school setting and in
law more generally. Identifying and understanding whiteness
should be an essential component of legal education. This
Article considers reasons why legal education rarely addresses
this normative role played by whiteness. An incomplete
understanding of the nature of white privilege and the modern
move toward "colorblindness" conceal the raced nature of much
law. To draw the harmful operation of colorblindness into relief,
this Article proposes adopting "color insight, " which would
admit that most of us do see race and underline the need to
understand what that racial awareness might mean. This Article
argues that color insight is particularly essential in the law school
environment where legal educators need to ensure that students
do not encounter race only by happenstance or believe race only
affects people of color. This Article provides classroom
techniques and institutional programming that would foster a
more complete understanding of the function of race and
whiteness in the law.
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INTRODUCTION
Every law student in the United States encounters the issue of
race at some point during his or her legal education. At the very
least, aspiring lawyers encounter race when studying the idea of
equality in constitutional law. Issues of equality in U.S. constitutional
history necessarily implicate racial justice, beginning with the
Constitution's slavery compromises and the decision to count only
taxed Native Americans and three-fifths of the slave population for
purposes of determining state representation in Congress.' The
1. "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which
shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those
bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all
other persons." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
eventually altered this language, but the document that U.S. culture celebrates as birthing
democracy also created a racialized hierarchy that continued as Latino/a Americans and
Asian Americans increasingly populated the United States. That racialized hierarchy
privileged-and continues to privilege-whiteness. See generally IRA I. KATZNELSON,
WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE (2005) (arguing that progressive reforms from
the 1930s through the post-war years benefited middle-class Whites); IAN F. HANEY
LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996) (exploring case
[Vol. 86
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Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal justice under the law
generates cases, even today, that attempt to locate the parameters of
racial equality.2 Race, as it arises in these contexts, usually concerns
the treatment of people of color.' This focus on race and racial justice
highlights the role of law in relation to non-Whites. Yet these
equality determinations implicitly situate people of color in relation
to an invisible or undiscussed white norm.4
The earliest racial equality cases under the Fourteenth
Amendment involved attempts by people of color to receive the same
treatment that the law accorded to Whites.' Challenges to exclusion
from white presence and from state institutions open only to Whites
formed the second generation of racial equality cases.6 More recent
law that determined whether naturalization applicants were white as required by federal
immigration law).
2. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.....
127 S. Ct. 2738, 2746 (2007) (deciding that equal protection was violated by K-12 public
school assignment schemes in Seattle and Louisville that used race as a factor in tie-
breaking (Seattle) or in making certain elementary school assignment decisions
(Louisville)).
3. But see Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Remedy: Under-Ruling Civil Rights in
Walker v. City of Mesquite, 85 CORNELL L. REV 1309, 1341-56 (2000) (detailing victories
by Whites in civil rights cases that serve to preserve white privilege).
4. Juan F. Perea, Buscando Am6rica: Why Integration and Equal Protection Fail To
Protect Latinos, 117 HARv. L. REV 1420, 1448 (2004) ("An explicit statement of
Whiteness as a norm for equality can be found in 42 U.S.C. § 1981, or the current version
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which was the predecessor of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The current language of § 1981 guarantees to all persons the same legal rights as those
'enjoyed by white citizens.' "). Perea observes: "A demonstrable norm of White racial
identity has, from early times, constituted the meaning of full citizenship and equality."
Id. at 1447.
Perea documents the "tension between the wish for a homogeneous nation and
the reality of a heterogeneous one." Id. at 1446. Perea quotes early leaders who
expressed a "desire for a racially and linguistically homogeneous White republic despite
conflicting demographic evidence." Id. at 1447. Whiteness has continued to be the
implicit measure of equality. See George A. Martfnez, Immigration and the Meaning of
United States Citizenship: Whiteness and Assimilation, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 335, 336 (2007)
(analyzing the role of whiteness for those seeking U.S. citizenship).
Catharine MacKinnon has made a similar argument in the gender area that men
are the measure by which women's equality is evaluated. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 216 (1989). According to MacKinnon,
under traditional equality theory women are "the same as" or "different from" men who
remain the measuring stick for the norm. Id. at 224.
5. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (invalidating a facially
neutral law for its egregiously discriminatory application against Chinese American
laundry owners); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (invalidating a West
Virginia statute that prevented persons of color from serving as jurors).
6. See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 216 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) ("[Tlhere is no constitutional difference between de facto and de jure
segregation for each is the product of state actions or policies."); Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
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equality cases have examined the permissibility of considering race as
a factor in allocating access to an economy and to institutions that,
even after the elimination of de jure racial segregation, continue to be
dominated by Whites and white interests.7 Given the primacy of
whiteness8 and white norms in the factual settings of equality cases,
the role of whiteness in constructing equality should be a topic for
thorough examination. But legal determinations of racial equality
rarely explore whiteness, which remains the hidden but generative
force that has propelled and continues to structure issues of race in
American law.
This Article posits that legal educators must develop an
understanding of the role of whiteness in the construction of equality
and teach future lawyers to do so as well. Professor John 0. Calmore,
347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (overturning segregation in schools); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537, 550-52 (1896) (upholding the constitutionality of racial segregation).
7. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (upholding the affirmative
action policy at the University of Michigan Law School); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (holding that racially conscious criteria in federal
contracting are subject to strict scrutiny, even when these criteria are used to correct
historical disadvantages); Piscataway Bd. of Educ. v. Taxman, 91 F.3d 1547, 1558 (3d Cir.
1996) (finding affirmative action policy in teacher hiring for purposes other than to
remedy past discrimination violates Title VII).
8. The meaning of white and whiteness as used in this Article is aptly described by
Tim Wise:
When I speak of "whites," or "white folks," I am referring to those persons,
typically of European descent, who are able, by virtue of skin color or perhaps
natural origin and cultures, to be perceived as "white," as members of the
dominant group. I do not consider the white race to be a real thing, in biological
terms, as modern genetics pretty well establishes that there are no distinct races
.... But the white race certainly has meaning in social terms, and it is in that
sense that I use the concept here.
TIM WISE, WHITE LIKE ME: REFLECTIONS ON RACE FROM A PRIVILEGED SON, at ix
(2005). Wise also notes, "when all other factors are equal, whiteness matters and carries
with it great advantage." Id.
Educational institutions have recently developed curricula in whiteness studies,
often named "critical white studies." Eric Arnesen, Whiteness and the Historians'
Imagination, 60 INT'L LAB. & WORKING-CLASS HIST. 3, 8-9 (2001) (emphasizing the
impact of whiteness studies on labor history and critiquing critical white studies for turning
the meaning of whiteness into a "moving target"). For more on critical white studies, see
generally RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES:
LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR (1997); MIKE HILL, AFTER WHITENESS: UNMAKING AN
AMERICAN MAJORITY (2004); ROBERT JENSEN, THE HEART OF WHITENESS:
CONFRONTING RACE, RACISM AND WHITE PRIVILEGE (2005); FRANCES E. KENDALL,
UNDERSTANDING WHITE PRIVILEGE: CREATING PATHWAYS TO AUTHENTIC
RELATIONSHIPS ACROSS RACE (2006); KARYN D. MCKINNEY, BEING WHITE: STORIES
OF RACE AND RACISM (2005); TONI MORRISON, PLAYING IN THE DARK: WHITENESS
AND THE LITERARY IMAGINATION (1993); GEORGE YANCY, WHAT WHITE LOOKS
LIKE: AFRICAN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS ON THE WHITENESS QUESTION (2004).
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whom this commemorative Issue honors, wrote of the need to
"[challenge] the universality of white experience [and] judgment as
the authoritative standard that binds people of color and normatively
measures, directs, controls, and regulates the terms of proper thought,
expression, presentment, and behavior."9 Identifying and confronting
whiteness may prove to be key factors in moving the nation forward
toward a more complete realization of racial equality.
This Article first examines the role of whiteness as the measure
of equality for all people, even as that white norm remains
unacknowledged. It then explores why whiteness often remains
invisible during discussions of race. Two central reasons foster that
invisibility: (1) the conflation of white privilege with white supremacy
and (2) the societal insistence upon colorblindness. This Article
suggests that legal educators, in order to train lawyers in the service
of democracy, must not only teach about race and racial justice, but
also discuss whiteness and white privilege as part of the racial
dialogue. Legal education needs to counter colorblindness with color
insight.
Because race is so central to the role of lawyers as
professionals, ° this Article next considers race in the law school
classroom and legal education's failure to consider race. Finally, this
Article argues that teaching about whiteness necessitates setting a
context for discussions about race and whiteness within law schools as
institutions and in large, Socratic-style classrooms as well as within
seminars.
I. WHITENESS AS THE DOMINANT MEASURE OF RACIAL NORMS
In many legal contexts, race refers to people of color in contrast
to a non-racialized and not-visible white norm. 1 For example, Plessy
9. John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing
an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129, 2160
(1992); see also id. at 2135 (drawing a link between jazz and critical race scholarship "to
illustrate a common tradition of African-American culture that speaks of a perspective
structured by emphatic declarations of dissent from dominant norms"). John Calmore is
an early critical race theorist, instrumental in developing oppositional legal scholarship.
10. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., BARBARA FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BUT Now I SEE: WHITE RACE
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE LAW 35-36 (1998); STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN WITH
CONTRIBUTIONS BY MARGALYNNE ARMSTRONG, ADRIENNE D. DAVIS & TRINA
GRILLO, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES
AMERICA 14 (1996) [hereinafter PRIVILEGE REVEALED]; Martha R. Mahoney,
Constructing Solidarity: Interest and White Workers, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 747, 748-
51, 763-71 (2000) ("[W]hites do not perceive white privilege and norms.").
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v. Ferguson2 upheld the constitutionality of racial segregation under
a "separate but equal" standard. Segregation meant separating
Blacks, Mexicans,13 or other people of color from Whites. Racial
separation did not inconvenience Whites as a group; people of color
used facilities inferior to those used by Whites or none at all.
Although unmentioned, white facilities served as the baseline for
equal protection. In the educational setting, no white school would
be reduced to match a black school to achieve equality. 4
In a more contemporary example, race and whiteness are not
mentioned in the text of federal laws that imposed disparate
sentences for the possession of rock cocaine (crack) and powder
cocaine, 5 drugs that are pharmacologically identical. 6 Prosecutors
charge Blacks disproportionately for possession of rock cocaine
compared to Whites who are more frequently prosecuted for
possession of powder cocaine.17 This disparate treatment of Blacks
and Whites furthers inequality.
When equality is at issue, establishing some kind of congruence
with the resources available to Whites is often the strategic aspiration.
Affirmative action programs try to increase access for non-Whites to
12. 163 U.S. 537, 550-52 (1896).
13. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 476 (1954) (petitioner claimed jury
service targeted "Mexicans," not Latinos generally, for segregation from Whites). For
more on Hernandez, see generally MICHAEL A. OLIVAS ET AL., "COLORED MEN" AND
"HOMBRES AQuf": HERNANDEZ V. TEXAS AND THE EMERGENCE OF MEXICAN-
AMERICAN LAWYERING (2006).
14. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 632-36 (1950) (commenting that no white
law student would attend the law school especially established for black students).
15. Federal Sentencing Guidelines, effective in 1987, provided five-year mandatory
minimum sentences for first-offense cocaine trafficking of 5 grams or more of crack
cocaine or 500 grams or more of powder cocaine, and ten-year mandatory minimum
sentences for 50 grams or more of crack cocaine or 5,000 grams or more of powder
cocaine. Executive Summary of Special Report on Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy,
in 2 GERALD F. UELMEN & VICTOR HADDOX, DRUG ABUSE AND THE LAW
SOURCEBOOK § 9:9, at 9-196 (1997-2005); U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, REP. TO
CONG.: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY IV (2002), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/r-congress/02crack/2002crackrpt.pdf. Federal mandatory sentences
were found to be unconstitutional in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005).
The Supreme Court determined that judges can impose a sentence for crimes involving
crack cocaine that is shorter than the 100-to-1 ratio recommended by the sentencing
guidelines. United States v. Kimborough, 552 U.S. -,... 128 S. Ct. 558, 564 (2007).
16. Drug Policy Alliance, Cocaine/Crack/Coca, http://www.drugpolicy.org/drugby
drug/cocainecrack/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2008).
17. UELMEN & HADDOX, supra note 15, § 9:9, at 9-203 ("Blacks accounted for 88.3
percent of federal crack cocaine distribution convictions in 1993. Hispanics 7.1 percent,
Whites 4.1 percent and others 0.5 percent. The racial breakdown for powder cocaine
distribution offenses sentenced in 1993 shows 32.0 percent White, 27.4 percent Black, 39.3
percent Hispanic, and 1.3 percent other.").
[Vol. 86
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these resources. Whites have raised equal protection challenges to
such programs in anti-affirmative action cases against institutions
which have attempted to include minorities into schools or
workplaces that have been and remain predominantly white.'" The
anti-affirmative action plaintiffs in these cases fail to acknowledge
that the institutions to which they seek entry remain primarily white, 9
further evidencing the unacknowledged benchmark role of whiteness.
The task of confronting the operation of whiteness in the law of
equality requires making visible and explicit the standards by which
law measures legal equivalence. Articulating the operation of
whiteness recognizes that every person in the classroom is relevant to
understanding the role of race in the legal system. Discussing
whiteness makes clear that issues of race and racial justice do not
solely concern people of color and the law. Rather, everyone has a
stake in understanding whiteness. Discussion of whiteness can lead to
awareness of other privileged statuses as well. Intersecting with race,
identity categories (like gender, class and economic background,
sexual orientation, physical ability, and educational achievement)
permeate the operation of privilege and law in the United States.2 °
The perpetuation of white dominance is racist, but as bell hooks
has written, liberal Whites do not see themselves as prejudiced or
interested in domination through coercion; yet, "they cannot
recognize the ways their actions support and affirm the very structure
of racist domination and oppression that they profess to wish to see
eradicated.'
The word "racist" may seem jarring to some, but:
18. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 317 (2003) (white petitioner alleged
the university had no compelling interest to accord minority status greater weight);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 204 (1995) (white petitioner alleged the
government's weighting grants of contracts to minority contractors violated Equal
Protection); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (white
petitioner alleged the use of racial "quotas" in higher education affirmative action policies
violated Equal Protection).
19. See, e.g., University of Michigan Law School, Your Life as a Michigan Law
Student: A Close Community of Scholars and Practitioners, http://www.law.umich.edu/
prospectivestudents/admissions/pages/community.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
According to its admissions statistics, the University of Michigan Law School, the school
at the center of Grutter, remains seventy-two percent white. Id.
20. See, e.g., PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 11, at 22-23 (presenting the
description of the Koosh ball as representing multiple strands of privilege and
subordination within each individual and in society).
21. BELL HOOKS, TALKING BACK: THINKING FEMINIST, THINKING BLACK 113
(1989).
2008]
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All whites are racist in this use of the term, because we benefit
from systemic white privilege. Generally whites think of racism
as voluntary, intentional conduct, done by horrible others.
Whites spend a lot of time trying to convince ourselves and
each other that we are not racist. A big step would be for
whites to admit that we are racist and then to consider what to
do about it.22
Overcoming avoidance of the issue is an important first step in
eliminating race-based oppression. Whites must realize that
recognition of their own racism is not an admission of intentional
wrongdoing. Nonetheless, while racism may not be intentional, it
continues to take a toll on non-Whites.
As non-white people have achieved greater levels of access and
opportunity, the appearance of white dominance has become less
blatant. But success in the United States often requires the adoption
of a kind of normative or performed whiteness.23  When in
predominantly white settings, non-Whites (using Blacks as an
example) must be "phenotypically but unconventionally black-that
is to say . . . 'look' but do not 'act' black."24 Illustrations of this
phenomenon include employment policies that prohibit hairstyles
favored by African Americans, such as corn rows25 or fade haircuts.26
22. PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 11, at 7, 21.
23. John 0. Calmore, Whiteness as Audition and Blackness as Performance: Status
Protest from the Margin, 18 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 99, 101-02 (2005).
Non-white performance in a dominantly white setting has been a historical
predicament.... [T]he rights enjoyed by white males could only be obtained
through assimilatory behavior. Under these circumstances, in social contract
terms, white performance was the quid pro quo for white privilege. Today, this is
still largely the quid pro quo, but this is a bad bargain for people of color.
Id.; see also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Race to the Top of the Corporate Ladder:
What Minorities Do When They Get There, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1645 (2004)
[hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Race to the Top] (arguing that racial minorities successful
in corporate life rarely reform the corporate structure to the advantage of racial minorities
that follow because they have to conform to "successful racial types"); Devon W. Carbado
& Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757,
1792-93 (2003) (book review) (arguing that corporate employers "screen for racial
palatability" among minority hires).
24. Carbado & Gulati, Race to the Top, supra note 23, at 1676-77.
25. See Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
26. Employee dress requirements at Abercrombie & Fitch prohibited a neat hairstyle
worn by many African American males. The policy stated that "a neatly combed,
attractive, natural, classic hairstyle is acceptable, but any type of 'fade' cut is
unacceptable." NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., The Classic Look of
Discrimination: Abercrombie & Fitch Charged with Employment Discrimination in
Federal Class Action Lawsuit, http://www.naacpldf.org/content.aspx?article=55 (last
visited Feb. 28, 2008).
[Vol. 86
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Prohibiting the speaking of Spanish on the job at all times similarly
requires Spanish speakers to "perform whiteness" at work.27
Discrimination against job applicants with black- or Latino-sounding
names' illustrates the screening function that conformance with
whiteness serves. Whites who recognize these expectations placed
upon people of color and who acknowledge that these demands arise
from a white perspective can begin to understand white privilege and
how it operates to subordinate non-white others.29
Most discussions of race not only fail to recognize whiteness, but
also reinscribe the existing racial hierarchy that privileges Whites.
Reva Siegel has described this process as "preservation-through-
transformation."3  Siegel explains that during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, women in relation to men, and people of color in
relation to white people, appeared historically and formally in law as
holding lower status in these hierarchical relationships.31
In gender [and] race ... , the legal system continued to allocate
privileges and entitlements in a manner that perpetuated [the]
former systems of express hierarchy. Analyzed from this
vantage point, the rise of liberal and capitalist systems of social
organization did not result in the dismantlement of status
27. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1486-87 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting
plaintiffs' charge that an English-only rule limits Spanish-speaking employees' ability to
"express their cultural heritage on the job"). See generally Christopher David Ruiz
Cameron, How the Garcia Cousins Lost Their Accents: Understanding the Language of
Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules as the Product of Racial Dualism,
Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1347 (1997) (seeking "to
understand why judges hold national origin challenges based on language discrimination
in such low esteem").
28. See Angela Onwuachi-Willing & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On
Being "Regarded as" Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal
Are White, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 1283, 1298-1300 (discussing legal implications of a recent
report that employers often reject applicants based on resumes bearing a black- or Latino-
seeming name); Mariane Bertrand, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha
and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination 10-13 (Mass. Inst. of
Tech. Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. 03-22, May 27, 2003), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=422902.
29. A white perspective that acknowledges that non-Whites must often operate in
"white spaces" and the privilege that operates in such spaces could mark a starting point
for responding to racism. john a. powell has theorized on "white space" as based on
individualistic, Hobbesian norms that harm people of all races. john a. powell, Dreaming
of a Self Beyond Whiteness and Isolation, 18 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 13, 36-37 (2005).
30. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1997); see also John 0.
Calmore, "Chasing the Wind": Pursuing Social Justice, Overcoming Legal Mis-Education,
and Engaging in Professional Re-Socialization, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1167, 1171 (2004)
(further exploring "preservation-through-transformation").
31. Siegel, supra note 30, at 1116.
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relationships, but instead precipitated their evolution into new
forms.32
Thus, even supposed transformation efforts may preserve
existing hierarchies in a new guise, often with evolving rhetoric that
sustains and legitimates hierarchy. As Kenji Yoshino observes,
"[T]he status hierarchy may be preserved precisely because the
rhetoric has changed, permitting social actors to tell a progress
narrative that legitimates the status quo."33 The current rhetoric of
colorblindness is an example of "preservation-through-
transformation" that hampers progress towards racial equality. The
conflation of white privilege with white supremacy similarly preserves
the racialized status quo.
II. THE INVISIBILITY OF WHITENESS REINFORCED
The failure to address whiteness in contemporary legal pedagogy
is not surprising given two related sets of beliefs: (1) the tendency to
conflate discussions of white privilege with white supremacy and (2)
the norm of colorblindness in the dominant culture. To be able to
move beyond the impasse in which racial equality remains mired, it is
essential to understand two points. First, white privilege does not
operate with the same dynamic as the now discredited notion of white
supremacy; and second, colorblindness perpetuates white privilege.
This Article first considers white supremacy, which involves attitudes
about racial characteristics and racial hierarchy, proclaiming the
superiority of Whites and the inferiority of others.34 The dominant
32. Id.
33. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 825 (2002) (theorizing models of
anti-discrimination that avoid the unintended consequence of perpetuating more insidious
forms of discrimination).
34. For more on white supremacy, see Margaret E. Montoya, Of "Subtle Prejudices,"
White Supremacy, and Affirmative Action: A Reply to Paul Butler, 68 U. COLO. L. REV.
891, 900-02 (1997) (defining white supremacy as "the way that whites have deployed racial
differences, from pre-colonial times to the present, to justify the creation and maintenance
of territorial, spiritual, moral, labor, social, constitutional, and other group hierarchies").
See also Mary Ellen Maatman, Speaking Truth to Memory: Lawyers and Resistance to the
End of White Supremacy, 50 How. L.J. 1, 7, 13 (2004) (arguing that the "two pillars" of
white supremacy are disenfranchisement and segregation); Michael Poulshok, The
Struggle Within the Struggle: White Supremacy in the Movement for Racial Justice, 14
TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 259, 260-61 (2004) (assessing white supremacy within
progressive movements based on "the subjective perceptions of people of color" and "the
presence of institutional racism"); c.f John 0. Calmore, Race-Concious Voting Rights and
the New Demography in a Multiracing America, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1260 (2001)
("[R]ace consciousness was delegitimated within the core cultures, because it was
associated with militant black nationalists and white supremacists.").
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culture now equates supremacist attitudes with extremists and fringe
elements." Nonetheless, the problematic history of white supremacy
in the law-in which judges, legislators, and drafters of constitutions
unabashedly asserted that the white race was superior to other
subordinate races-still tarnishes the legal system.
A. White Privilege Differs from White Supremacy
Although rooted in white supremacy, white privilege is more
powerful and pervasive than the beliefs or perceptions of supremacy
because white privilege actively continues to dictate the terms of day-
to-day life in the United States. White privilege establishes whiteness
as society's baseline or norm, ultimately determining who has
presumptive access to citizenship, material goods, political power, and
social standing.37 While mainstream thought in the United States
would now consider white supremacy to be morally repugnant and
explicitly rejected, white privilege remains largely unacknowledged.
The existence of white privilege allows white people of good will-
many with antiracist views-to benefit from the privileged white
norms.
Legal educators encounter the juncture of white supremacy and
white privilege in two commonly taught constitutional law cases that
explicitly proclaim whiteness as the societal norm and also starkly
condone white supremacy. Dred Scott v. Sanford38 and Plessy v.
35. As an indication of how far from the mainstream white supremacist ideology has
moved, even the conservative and openly anti-immigrant group, the Minutemen, fear the
"white supremacist" label. Judy Keen, Calls To Get Tough on Illegals Grow, USA
TODAY, Apr. 19, 2006, at A3. A leader of the Minutemen told a reporter for USA Today
that they were conducting "background checks to prevent white supremacists from
forming chapters." Id. Another member from Kansas wrote an editorial specifically
refuting charges that the group was composed of "hard-core white supremacists." Ed
Hayes, Op-Ed., Ed Hayes on the Minutemen: Our Mission Is About Security and Jobs, Not
Race as I See It, KAN. CITY STAR, May 24, 2007, at B8.
36. HANEY L6PEZ, supra note 1, at 3-9 (discussing the "racial prerequisite" cases in
the early 1900s in which a determination of race preceded conferral of citizenship).
37. PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 11, at 14.
The characteristics and attributes of those who are privileged group members are
described as societal norms-as the way things are and as what is normal in
society. This normalization of privilege means that members of society are judged,
and succeed or fail, measured against the characteristics that are held by those
privileged.
Id.
38. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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Ferguson3 9 are problematic because they uphold and valorize white
supremacy. 4° Both cases are infamous and notably overruled.41
The discourses concerning whiteness in both decisions, and even
in the Plessy dissenting opinion, are paeans to white supremacy.
Dred Scott extols Whites as human, civilized, and endowed with
absolute power over a black race subject to the "deepest
degradation."4  Plessy's dissent proclaims white supremacy: "The
white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And
so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in
power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time .... ,,4' But
the Plessy Court's supremacist ruminations should not distract the
reader from examining the white privilege Homer Plessy and his
attorneys indicted in the very pleadings of the case: "The petition for
the writ of prohibition averred that petitioner ... was entitled to
every right, privilege, and immunity secured to citizens of the United
39. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
40. In Dred Scott the Court noted:
The question before us is, whether the class of persons described in the plea in
abatement compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members of this
sovereignty? We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not
intended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution, and can
therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides
for and secures to citizens of the United States. On the contrary, they were at that
time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been
subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained
subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who
held the power and the Government might choose to grant them.
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404-05. Plessy expressed a similar sentiment:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race
with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in
the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon
it.... If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United
States cannot put them upon the same plane.
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551-52.
41. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution mooted the Dred Scott
case's denial of citizenship to African Americans. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The
Supreme Court of the United States, in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
explicitly overruled Plessy. Id. at 494-95; see also john a. powell, The Tensions Between
Integration and School Reform, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 655, 663 (2001) (describing
how Brown also overruled Dred Scott because Brown "embodied a pledge ... [to] educate
youth for citizenship").
42. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 409.
43. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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States of the white race .... ,"4 While Justice Harlan's dissent agreed,
stating "[o]ur Constitution is color-blind,"45 he made that statement
as he applauded white superiority. Justice Harlan's dissent equated
whiteness with supremacy and turned the focus away from Plessy's
desire for white privilege.46 Ironically, the modern emphasis on
colorblindness averts examination of that white privilege described in
Homer Plessy's complaint.47
Brown v. Board of Education48 held that excluding non-white
children from white public schools failed to satisfy the Constitution's
requirement of equal protection of the law.49 Brown radically departs
from the supremacist rhetoric of earlier Supreme Court decisions.
The Court's language in Brown implies that racial supremacy is a
fallacy: "To separate (children in grade and high schools) from others
of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates
a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."5
Rather than confronting the nature of the challenged inequality as a
practice that privileged whiteness and subordinated non-white others,
the decision referred to the relief sought by the plaintiff as "admission
to the public schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis."51
The Brown opinion relegated to a footnote the Delaware trial court's
specific recognition that equality meant that black children should
receive "educational opportunities ... available to white children
otherwise similarly situated."52 Thus, the Supreme Court's use of the
term "nonsegregated" obscured the Delaware court's recognition that
white children's education was superior, privileging them. So even
though, in Brown, the Supreme Court moved beyond white
supremacy discourse, the existing white privilege remained
unacknowledged, still alive and powerful.53
44. Id. at 541. Plessy's pleadings, which expressed his own internalized white
supremacist views, alleged that he "was seven eighths Caucasian and one eighth African
blood; that the mixture of colored blood was not discernible in him." Id.
45. Id. at 559.
46. Id.
47. See infra Part II.B (discussing colorblindness).
48. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
49. Id. at 493-95.
50. Id. at 494.
51. Id. at 487.
52. Id. at 494 n.10 (quoting Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A.2d 862, 865 (Del. Ch. 1952)).
53. The failure to hold state protection of white privilege explicitly unconstitutional
left the Brown decision open to the criticism that the decision failed to recognize the
constitutional supremacy of white associational interests in excluding Blacks from their
presence. Herbert Weschler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
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B. Colorblindness
Discussions about race today occur in an era when the societal
notion of colorblindness is a dominant value. 4 The idealized notion
of colorblindness tells us that noticing race is wrong because people
are equal. The hegemony of colorblindness suggests that by noticing
race, one is undermining equality itself. Any conversation about race,
or about whiteness in particular, must work against that dominant
social norm.
Television provides a snapshot of this norm's operation within
popular culture. Satirist Stephen Colbert emphasized the irony
embedded in the idea of colorblindness when, in his role as a
conservative news pundit on The Colbert Report, he interviewed
African American sports reporter Bill Rhoden55 about Rhoden's
book Forty Million Dollar Slaves.56 Colbert, seated across a table and
looking directly at the dark-skinned and very obviously black
Rhoden, said, "I don't see color. I don't see race. Are you a black
person? I see [an] American.57 I am like an infant, I see shapes.
Doesn't color divide this country?"58 Rhoden answered that seeing
color is not the problem. 9 He then tried to talk about power, but
Colbert interrupted the conversation before Rhoden could truly
comment on the subject of power.6°
This exchange illustrates several key aspects of the operation of
colorblindness as a rhetorical device. The focus on colorblindness
values not-seeing-color and stops the possibility of dialogue about
race before it can begin. In stopping the discussion, the mantra of
colorblindness also cuts off any dialogue about power or racial
L. REV. 1, 34 (1959) ("[W]here the state must practically choose between denying the
association to those individuals who wish it or imposing it on those who would avoid it, is
there a basis in neutral principles for holding that the Constitution demands that the
claims for association should prevail?").
54. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, SEEING A COLOR-BLIND FUTURE: THE PARADOX
OF RACE 8-9 (1997); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44
STAN. L. REV. 1, 16 (1991) (arguing that "nonrecognition" of race is a technique that
"fosters the systematic denial of racial subordination"); Stephanie M. Wildman, The
Persistence of White Privilege, 18 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y REV. 245, 251 (2005) (identifying
a "contemporary cultural push to colorblindness").
55. The Colbert Report (Comedy Central television broadcast Aug. 8, 2006)
[hereinafter Colbert].
56. WILLIAM C. RHODEN, FORTY MILLION DOLLAR SLAVES: THE RISE, FALL AND
REDEMPTION OF THE BLACK ATHLETE (2006).
57. Cf. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (Scalia, J., concurring)
("We are just one race here. It is American.").
58. Colbert, supra note 55.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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privilege. With no ability even to talk about race or racial justice, the
status quo remains. Thus, the dominant value of colorblindness
maintains the status quo of white privilege: "Colorblindness is the
new racism. ',6
1
An aspiration to color insight would serve society as a better
value than colorblindness. Color insight would encourage noticing
race in each context in which it arises, including the operation of
white privilege and any other advantaging or disadvantaging function
of race. Rather than suppressing an awareness of race, as an
aspiration to colorblindness does, color insight would encourage
further exploration of the impact of race in society.
For example, in the school financing case San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez,62 the Edgewood school
district, where Mr. Rodriguez's children attended school, spent only
two-thirds as much per pupil compared to the Alamo Heights school
district's per student expenditures. 63 The residents of the Edgewood
district were predominately Mexican American; in contrast, the
residents of Alamo Heights were predominately "Anglo. '64  The
Court's analysis downplayed the role of race or ethnicity or wealth in
the resulting educational disparities. 65 This failure to notice race
impacted later litigation. In 1996, the Fifth Circuit decided Hopwood
v. Texas,66 a challenge to the admissions policy at the University of
Texas School of Law. The court rejected as unconstitutional the
school's affirmative action plan, designed to remedy de facto
segregation. 67  Read together these cases illustrate the poverty of
colorblindness.
Children who attended kindergarten in Texas at the time
Rodriguez was decided were 25 years old when the Hopwood
litigation began.... Texans who were in the applicant pool to
attend the University of Texas Law School grew up in an
educational system that had allowed vast differentials in their
publically funded education because of Rodriguez.68
61. Benjamin Kuo, Santa Clara Law student, Comment During Social Justice
Thursday Discussion at Santa Clara University Law School (Oct. 19, 2006). For a
discussion of Social Justice Thursday, see infra notes 113, 127-28 and accompanying text.
62. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
63. Id. at 11-13.
64. Id. at 12.
65. Beverly Moran & Stephanie M. Wildman, Race and Wealth Disparity: The Role of
Law and the Legal System, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1219,1226 (2007).
66. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
67. Id. at 934.
68. Moran & Wildman, supra note 65, at 1226.
HeinOnline -- 86 N.C. L. Rev. 649 2007-2008
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Thus, the colorblind approach caused the courts to emphasize a
theoretical neutrality that actually had a race-based differential
impact. Noticing race by applying color insight could have resulted in
true justice for the children who were denied educational
opportunities at two points in the public education system.
Color insight would serve to promote equality and to emphasize
non-discrimination among races. Color insight would admit that most
of us do see race and underline the need to understand what that
racial awareness might mean. Color insight would not assume that
people or groups have any specific traits or propensities. Teaching to
develop color insight, rather than colorblindness, would better
prepare students for the heterogeneous, democratic society that
American ideals embrace.
Given the status quo of white privilege, recognizing the context 69
in which conversations about race can occur is critical. One aspect of
that context is the society and social history in which the conversation
takes place. Legal educators must also note that they work in the
institutional context of a particular school and within a specific
classroom setting (either a "race" or a "non-race" course, a large
section course or a seminar). These multiple contexts complicate
conversations about race and whiteness.
69. See John 0. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause
Lawyering at the Intersection of Race, Space and Poverty, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1927,
1927-46 (1999). John Calmore issued a call for context in a different setting:
By issuing a call to context, I am directing attention to the inner-city poor's lived
experiences, including the interconnection of legal and non-legal issues they
confront, the web of experiences within which they live, and what Michael Katz
calls "their anchor in context." This suggests that we cannot view their issues or
the features of context as fixed and unchanging. Instead, we must view them as
historically evolving, relational, changing in meaning, and, as Katz says, "to be
interpreted in terms of time and place."
Id. at 1927-28.
Examining oppression faced by his clients, Calmore found it was "group-based,
structured, and systemic." Id. at 1938. He deplored the marginalization of his clients that
removed them from the option of societal participation. He suggested that advocates
"search for invitation, opportunity, and connection," urging that "[a]n open mind and
correct sensibility may be more important than the command of technical craft, because
often we must learn as we go." Id. at 1956. Similarly, in seeking to set institutional and
classroom contexts to discuss race and whiteness, we must be willing to learn as we go.
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III. LEGAL EDUCATION'S FAILURE To TALK ABOUT RACE AND
WHITENESS
For the most part, legal educators do not teach about race.70
Hidden within the already inadequately studied issue of race and
absent from discussions of equality, whiteness remains largely
invisible within legal education. As legal educators, we often do not
notice the operation of race in our classrooms and daily lives. In
those rare instances when race is the subject, race remains defined as
an issue about people of color. Rarely, in the law school classroom,
does race refer to whiteness.71 In the authors' experience, students of
color remain the majority in many race and the law classes. While
many white students do enroll in race courses, the relative dearth of
white students suggests a view that these classes are a subject of
interest primarily to "raced" others. Whiteness can literally become a
physical absence in classes in which the acknowledged subject of the
class is race. To reach white students, who may be accustomed to
ignoring race, legal educators must be willing to speak about race in
almost all situations and to examine whiteness in these discussions.
When racial inequality is the issue, it is particularly crucial to make
the whiteness referent explicit.
It is hard to talk and teach about race in the law school
classroom, but it is even harder to address whiteness. Teaching about
race needs to be linked expressly to exploring whiteness and making
the systemic privileging of whiteness visible for future lawyers.
Lawyers serve as officers of the court72 and have a professional
responsibility to foster the pursuit of justice that is an essential
element of democratic practice.73 Given these roles, knowledge about
70. Lisa Chiyemi Ikemoto, Some Tips on How To Endanger the White Male Privilege
in Law Teaching, 19 W. NEW. ENG. L. REV. 79, 79-80 (1997); see also Judith G.
Greenberg, Erasing Race from Legal Education, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 51, 55 (1994)
(observing the norm of whiteness in legal education and "[r]ace is addressed only through
widespread silence").
71. But see JUAN F. PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR
A DIVERSE AMERICA 487-571 (2d ed. 2007) (describing and analyzing whiteness as a
racialized group).
72. James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization of "Officer
of the Court," 48 BUFF. L. REV. 349, 352-58 (2000).
73. Stephanie M. Wildman, Democracy and Social Justice: Founding Centers for
Social Justice in Law Schools, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 252, 252-55 (2005). Social justice law
encompasses the protection of democratic ideals such as "life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness," equality, and representative government. Thus, promoting individual and
collective well-being, enhancing human dignity, ending discrimination, and correcting
imbalances of power and wealth are the province of social justice lawyers. Social justice
lawyers work to give "material meaning to these ideals in the daily lives of individuals and
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racial issues should be central to legal education. Discussions about
race in general, and whiteness in particular, need to be more than
accidental occurrences in students' education. How legal educators
teach about race in law school should be a major concern.74
In this racialized world, race enters the law school classroom
even when faculty do not name or discuss it. Legal education culture,
despite its reputation for liberalism, tends to "whitewash" law,
ignoring the roles of whiteness and privilege in the construction of
legal rules and institutions and the application of law.75 Some
teachers examine race in criminal law classes or aspects of other first-
year subjects, but many do not because they fear addressing the issue
or do not believe in its relevance. The issue of race appears in
"special interest classes" like race and the law or law and social
justice, reinforcing the idea that the subject should be
compartmentalized and only a concern for some race specialists.76
communities that are marginalized, subordinated, and underrepresented." MARTHA R.
MAHONEY, JOHN 0. CALMORE & STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE:
PROFESSIONALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LAW 1 (2003). Given this commitment to
marginalized, subordinated, and underrepresented communities and individuals, social
justice lawyers must necessarily be working for racial justice. See generally PENDA D.
HAIR, LOUDER THAN WORDS: LAWYERS, COMMUNITIES AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
JUSTICE: A REPORT TO THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION (2001) (concurring with the
assessment that social justice lawyering necessarily included addressing issues of race,
noting the link between racial exclusion and other societal ills).
The State Bar of California requires attorneys to attend continuing legal
education on elimination of bias in the profession. See State Bar of California, MCLE
"Regular" Requirement, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar extend.jspcid=
10138 (last visited Jan. 23, 2008) (noting one-hour requirement for Minimum Continuing
Legal Education in "Elimination of Bias in the Legal Profession"). The "elimination of
bias" continuing legal education requirement reflects a growing recognition that all
lawyers are obligated to promote justice and equality no matter what the specific nature of
their practice may be. Oregon and Minnesota also have mandatory "elimination of bias"
CLE requirements. See Oregon State Bar, Minimum Continuing Legal Education Rules
and Regulations, R. 3.2, 5.5 (effective April 26, 2007), available at
http://www.osbar.org/docs/rulesregs/mclerules.pdf; Minnesota Board of Continuing Legal
Education, Rules of the Minnesota State Board of Continuing Legal Education, R. 6(B)
(effective July 1, 1996), available at http://www.mbcle.state.mn.us/mbcle/pages/rules.asp.
74. Kim Forde-Mazrui, Learning Law Through the Lens of Race, 21 J.L. & POL. 1, 1-
3 (2005) (urging the importance of studying race with law, including an extensive
bibliography of sources).
75. MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-
BLIND SOCIETY 22 (2003) (noting that "discussions of racial inequality commonly dwell
on only one side of the color line").
76. Cf. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31,
31-32 (1992) (outlining a similar debate in the field of legal ethics about how to best teach
the subject); Joan Howarth, Teaching in the Shadow of the Bar, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 927,
927-35 (1997) (describing how the bar dictates subject matter in legal education; but, as
the world has changed, the notion of bar courses has not kept up, specifically with regard
to clinical and skills requirements).
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Even in these classes, teaching about whiteness remains an often
overlooked aspect of teaching about race.
A. Race in the Law School Classroom
It is never easy to discuss race in the classroom. Race remains a
sensitive subject in the United States, particularly when the
conversation occurs across racial lines. Students and faculty may fear
they will be misunderstood or viewed as racist. The prevailing notion
of colorblindness77 suggests that recognizing race is inappropriate.
Students often resist discussing any issue that they perceive to be
outside of the course subject area. Notwithstanding efforts to avoid
the topic, race remains present. Too often legal educators suppress
opportunities to examine issues of race, including whiteness, when
they could help students to engage thoughtfully with these issues.
The following anecdote illustrates some of the barriers to and
risks of discussing race in the law school classroom.78 In a civil
procedure class, a few weeks into the semester, one case involving the
suspension of several children from school reported that one child
was black. Other cases made no mention of the race of the parties.
Several classes later, discussing a different case, the professor probed
reasons for the plaintiff's involvement. "She was poor; she was
probably homeless," said one student. A man in the first row raised
his hand and offered in a helpful spirit, "She was probably black." A
woman a few seats away turned to him angrily and said, "Now why
would you think that?"
The professor intervened, saying, "We will talk more about this
later." The professor continued that day with the planned discussion
of the case without further mentioning race.
After class, several students approached the professor and said,
"We are so glad you stopped the conversation about race, so we could
study what we are here for-the real subject." Other students
approached the professor to say they did want to talk about race.
The professor returned to discuss the race issues at the outset of
the next class meeting. The professor had wanted to give the students
involved a chance to speak with each other and to give the class a
chance to reflect on the exchange. The professor began the class by
explaining that legal education rarely offers enough opportunity to
discuss the important implications of race and race-based issues,
77. See supra Part II.B (discussing colorblindness).
78. These events occurred during a law class in the United States in 2006. The
authors elect to maintain the anonymity of the professor and students involved.
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particularly in a civil procedure course that tends to be very rules-
based. The professor engaged the students in a conversation about
the implications of identifying the race of the parties for the purposes
of study and how those identities might impact litigation.
By deferring the discussion of race, the professor diffused a
possible battle over the issue. By placing race at the forefront of the
discussion when returning to it in the next class, the professor was
able to lead a more nuanced exchange. The issue, as it initially had
arisen in class, presented a classic classroom conflict about race.
Typically a student makes a comment not intending to offend, but the
remark triggers a visceral response from another student who bristles
at the stereotyping embedded in the statement. Waiting until the
next class separated the subject from the emotions that the topic
triggered when the issue first emerged. Focusing on the importance
of the subject and the frequent failure to examine it enabled a
learning opportunity. By beginning the next class with the subject of
race, the professor rejected the value of colorblindness that had led
students to believe that race was not important to discuss. The
professor rather provided the class with an opportunity to apply color
insight in the context of their own classroom dynamic.
The male student's mention of race provoked another student to
confront him about his assumptions. Other students believed that the
discussion of race was irrelevant. But race is clearly present in this
story. As you read it, did you ascribe racial identities to the
participants? Would the race of the actors have any bearing or
significance on your own response to the story? Did the race of the
students in the exchange affect your reaction to their interchange?
What race do you think the students who commented after class
were? Of what significance is the race or gender of the professor?
As the anecdote and the responses to these questions show, most
people fill in racial information from narrative cues.79 Some readers
of this story have assumed that the professor was a white male who
was glossing over the importance of race and moving on. Why might
those readers have made that assumption? Does a professor of color
have greater latitude in handling a conversation about race or might
that professor face other constraints? Is it possible to assess the
meaning of the story through a "colorblind" lens?
Professor Amy Kastely discusses the phenomenon of filling in
racial information from narrative cues and its implications for law by
79. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
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examining Toni Morrison's short story Recitatif,80 a narrative that
leaves the reader to supply the race of the parties. Kastely observes:
Whether casual and unthinking or deliberate and deceitful,
whether informed by charity or domination, use of raced factual
inferences and raced doctrine maintains white norms as legal
norms, thus assuring legal enforcement of institutional and
ideological white supremacy. Whether these practices are
unthinking or deliberate, it is important for lawyers to expose
and dishonor them. 8
1
Following Professor Kastely's advice to expose and dishonor the
common use of racial inferences liberates law professors to examine
the elephant in the room too often ignored.82 Even when professors
do not mention race as part of a course, race in general and whiteness
in particular are present in the law school classroom and embedded in
the law the professor teaches. 83 Race and the whiteness within race
infuse discussions from which race is verbally absent, often resulting
in alienation of students who become frustrated by the classroom
silence on this important topic. 84 Race and whiteness affect students
and faculty from all racialized groups, but they often affect students
and faculty of color differently from white students and faculty.
B. Barriers to Discussing Race and Whiteness
When a discussion about race arises spontaneously in a
classroom setting, white students and professors may experience
discomfort about being misinterpreted or fear making a comment
80. Toni Morrison, Recitatif, in CONFIRMATION: AN ANTHOLOGY OF AFRICAN
AMERICAN WOMEN 243, 243-61 (Amiri Baraka & Amina Baraka eds., 1983).
81. Amy H. Kastely, Out of the Whiteness: On Raced Codes and White Race
Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal, and Contract Law, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 269, 314
(1994).
82. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 49 (1991)
(describing race as the elephant in the room); see PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 11,
at 76-78.
83. When entering a law school classroom would you consciously notice the race of
the teacher? Does your answer depend on the race of the teacher? On whether the
teacher is white? Black? Does your answer depend on what your race is? A room full of
white people is about race, about who has been excluded and who has access; but for many
white people race can be "safely" ignored if no people of color are present.
84. See Stephanie M. Wildman, Democratic Community and Privilege: The Mandate
for Inclusive Education, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1429, 1437 (1997) (discussing ways to ensure
"safety within our classroom communities"); Stephanie M. Wildman, Privilege and
Liberalism in Legal Education: Teaching and Learning in a Diverse Environment, 10
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 88, 97 (1995) (exploring ways to lessen the alienation
experienced by minority students in class).
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that might be perceived by students as racially insensitive.
Impromptu discussions of race raise different issues for faculty of
color. When a white professor chooses to allow spontaneous
discussion of race to continue, students and colleagues do not seem to
view the white professor's decision as self-interested, although Whites
may be labeled advocates of "political correctness."85  Faculty of
color, however, may be seen as mounting a soapbox. What goes
unacknowledged is that even without raising the issue of race, faculty
of color bring race into the classroom by their mere presence because
the "norm" for faculty remains white in most law schools.86 The
faculty member of color, just like the student of color, is a rare visible
minority in the majority of law school classrooms and is at risk when
these discussions occur.
Teachers of color often face hostility from students merely for
raising racial justice issues. Robert Chang reports an anonymous
student evaluation that he received after his first year of teaching law:
"Leave the racist comments out. Go visit Korea if you don't like it
here. We need to unite as a country not drive wedges between us.'"87
The student's message made to Chang echoes the more general
accusation: "All you ever do is think about (or write about) race."
The unspoken message in both Chang's evaluation and the more
general accusation is that conversation about race does not belong in
the law school classroom, a message conveyed by the civil procedure
students who spoke to the professor at the end of their class.88 One
must wonder how many ideas and learning opportunities are lost
because of this attitude that examining race is not worthy of
classroom time. Would the accusation "all you ever discuss is law and
economics" be equally damning? White privilege flourishes in an
atmosphere that minimizes the legitimacy and importance of
examining race. Some white students even may assume they lack as
much of a personal stake in racial justice issues as non-white students.
85. See Patricia J. Williams, Defending The Gains, in BEYOND PC: TOWARDS A
POLITICS OF UNDERSTANDING 191 (Patricia Aufderheide ed., 1992).
86. Surveys indicate that fifty-seven to sixty-nine percent of U.S. law faculty are white.
PATI ABDULLINA, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS STATISTICAL REPORT
ON LAW FACULTY 2006-2007, at 4-5, 17-18 (2007), available at http://www.aals.org/
statistics/0607/0607statistics.pdf.
87. Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race
Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241, 1299 (1993).
88. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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However, because lawyers are officers of the court, race and
whiteness are issues for which we are all responsible.89
For this African American professor [Margalynne], bringing up
race in the property class has generated a range of responses. For
several years, when covering the materials on housing discrimination
in my first-year property course, I showed a videotape in which an
African American plaintiff who had successfully pursued a fair
housing claim described her experience of, and reaction to, housing
discrimination.9" The video generated a wide spectrum of reactions
including student appreciation, student eyeball rolling, dismissive
comments after class,91 student attacks in course evaluations, and the
question "Do you always show propaganda to your students?" from a
colleague who was sitting in on my class. Reactions such as these
illustrate why it is difficult to discuss race in required law school
classes and indicate that discussions of whiteness might prove equally
or more difficult.
IV. WHAT LEGAL EDUCATORS AND LAW SCHOOLS CAN Do
American society is built with many, many white spaces. 92 One
predominantly white space that shapes and forms its inhabitants is the
academy. Yet some may wonder, how can the academy be a white
space now, when so many more people of color are present as
students and teachers than ever before?
Charles Lawrence (a noted African American founder of critical
race theory) had a dream before he got tenure. 93 In the dream, he
was struggling to be himself in the presence of a monolithic white
maleness that wanted to oppress him and to deny his intellect, his
89. See Beverly Daniel Tatum, Defining Racism: "Can We Talk?," in READINGS FOR
DIVERSITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 79, 82 (Maurianne Adams et al. eds., 2000) (citing costs
to Whites of system of racism).
90. See Videotape: Housing Discrimination-Who Should Ever Have To Get Used
to That?, (HOPE Fair Housing Center of Lombard, Ill., 1991); see also PRIVILEGE
REVEALED, supra note 11, at 43-44 (discussing comments which were originally made in
the video by Professor Okainer Christian Dark).
91. Students who overheard these comments repeated them to Margalynne.
92. John 0. Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation: "Hewing a
Stone of Hope from a Mountain of Despair," 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1234-35 (1995)
(explaining how "location and community are carried and placed on racial identity" to
create white and black space).
93. Charles R. Lawrence III, A Dream: On Discovering the Significance of Fear, 10
NOVA L.J. 627, 627-30 (1986) [hereinafter Lawrence, A Dream]; Charles R. Lawrence III,
The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231,
2231-33 (1992); see also PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 11, at 1-2 (discussing
Lawrence's dream).
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humanity, and his belonging in the academic community.94  I
[Stephanie] appeared in his dream and attempted to speak on his
behalf, but the white man and I spoke as if Lawrence were not there.95
This portrayal disturbed me because I know Lawrence can speak
for himself. He, too, recognized this fact, and when he wrote about
the dream, he described my discomfort at participating in this
conversation that made him invisible.96  But this portrayal also
disturbed me because it made clear my privileged role in the
academy, a role I had not previously acknowledged.
Lawrence was describing the privilege of whiteness that would
allow me and the man in the dream to talk about Lawrence and issues
of race in a particular way, between ourselves and to his exclusion.
Our shared white privilege meant that our conversation mattered in
terms of the decision as to whether Lawrence would ultimately be
part of the community. Our whiteness defined the community,
although neither the man nor I articulated that fact or were even
necessarily aware of it. That we were both white gave us more than
something in common; it gave us the definitive common ground that
transcended our own differences and gave shape to us as a group with
power to define who else would be included in the circle of the
academy.
Within this community of whiteness, the academy replicates itself
as a predominately white institution serving predominately white
interests. This replication impacts how students study law, and it
further reproduces itself as they enter the legal profession. Legal
educators must name and talk about whiteness to identify this cycle
and move toward more inclusive practices.
Developing an ability to talk in the classroom and in the
institution about race and the whiteness that is part of race
necessarily begins with faculty studying the issue for ourselves, in our
own lives. That work invokes a commitment to a lifetime of learning;
teachers cannot talk with a class about these issues without first
thinking about them or discussing them in our own circle of peers.
Preparation outside the classroom will help the instructor lead
conversations that may arise within it.97
94. Lawrence, A Dream, supra note 93, at 627-30.
95. Id. at 628.
96. Id.
97. Frances Ansley provides a useful collection of resources analyzing race in the law
school classroom:
Numerous authors have considered race as a feature of contemporary legal
education and legal pedagogy. See, e.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY
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A. From Talking About Race to Teaching About Whiteness
Talking to white students about whiteness often involves
teaching about race more generally. White students may have
assumptions that are common to and a result of white privilege.
White students may think that they do not have a race or that racial
issues do not matter in their own lives. Many white law students do
not recognize white racial privilege. Some may even believe that they
are not privileged because they lack economic privilege or failed to
gain admission to an elite college or university.
In proposing to discuss race in the law school classroom, this
Article makes the following assumptions. A racial hierarchy does
exist in the contemporary United States that privileges whiteness.
Whiteness defines the institutional norm in most law schools.98 Race
enters the room when each of us steps into the classroom, but it
enters in a different way for the white teacher and for the teacher of
color. When a white teacher enters the classroom, white students see
him or her as a professor and for the most part do not see race. 99
Race enters the room with each student as well as with the professor.
Again, because of the racial hierarchy that privileges whiteness,
students of color and white students remain situated differently with
respect to discussions of race and whiteness. Racial balance in the
classroom impacts the discussion as well. A discussion with thirty
white students and one student of color would be very different from
a discussion with fifteen students of color and fifteen white students.
OF RACE AND RIGHTS 80-97 (1991) (chapter entitled "Crimes Without Passion");
Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal
Education, 11 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1 (1989) (discussing difficulties minority students
face in the classroom and suggesting ways to overcome them); Jerome M. Culp,
Jr., Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and Teaching: Finding the Me in the
Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539 (1991) (black law professor begins law courses
with personal narrative); Gerald P. L6pez, The Work We Know So Little About, 42
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1989) (using narrative to give another perspective); Mari J.
Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential
Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7 (1989) (urging lawyers to see the world from
the viewpoint of the oppressed).
Frances Lee Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculum in Legal Education, 79 CAL. L. REV.
1511, 1518 n.18 (1991).
98. But compare the mission statement for Howard University School of Law urging
engagement in solving "problems that are of particular concern to minority groups."
Howard University, Mission Statement, http://www.law.howard.edu/774 (last visited Jan.
23, 2008).
99. But compare discussion by the late Jerome Culp, an African American law
professor, who describes his first day class experience, infra notes 120-23 and
accompanying text. Culp's students did not need reminding of the presence of race, which
visibly entered the room with him.
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The racial diversity of a particular classroom may impact the level of
racial awareness as well as the potential for deep conversation about
racial justice.
Even when racial awareness exists in the classroom, students and
professors are often reluctant to talk about race. 100 White participants
may particularly fear making a racist statement or otherwise showing
racial ignorance. Faculty of all races fear causing emotional damage
to students of color who may not wish the added attention that a
discussion of race may bring to their presence. Any discussion of
race, particularly when instituted by a white professor, highlights the
presence of students of color in the room. Yet, presumably, students
of color attend class for their own legal education and not as fodder
for white students to learn about race. Regina Austin urged
participants at an American Association of Law Schools Plenary
Session to make certain that students of color were learning needed
material for their own educations and not serving as the teachers in
the class, especially on matters of race.'0 1 A professorial interest in
talking about race and whiteness must not impair the educational
experience for students of color. 2
A professor may also fear emotional damage to white students.1 3
If a discussion suggests a student's racism, a professor may be unsure
about how to handle the backlash from the conversation. Any
conversation about race that does not occur in a class on race and the
law also runs the risk of criticism from students for being "off
100. See, e.g., Leslie Espinoza Garvey, The Race Card: Dealing with Domestic Violence
in the Courts, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 287, 296-300 (2003) (exploring the
difficulty of talking about race yet emphasizing the importance for culturally competent
lawyering); Charles R. Lawrence III, Forbidden Conversations: On Race, Privacy, and
Community (A Continuing Conversation with John Ely on Racism and Democracy), 114
YALE L.J. 1353, 1355-56 (2005) (describing conversations about race as taboo in society).
101. Regina Austin, Speech at the Plenary Session of the American Association of Law
Schools (Jan. 6, 1990) (transcript on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
102. Race is central to legal education, yet legal educators must avoid using non-white
students as teaching tools. Some might find this assertion confusing when contrasted with
a white student's perception that she attends law school for her own legal education and
not to be racially "sensitized." However, these ideas are not parallel. No student should
be required to be the object of learning unless all students are. In contrast, students who
feel that classroom time spent on race detracts from the study of legal rules fail to
recognize the importance for practicing attorneys of cultural competence and attention to
injustice.
103. See Judith A.M. Scully, Seeing Color, Seeing Whiteness, Making Change: One
Woman's Journey in Teaching Race and American Law, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 59, 65 (2007)
(acknowledging the emotional impact of the topic for all students, in the setting of a
predominately white class).
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subject." Professors of color who raise racial justice issues may be
especially susceptible to criticism that "all they talk about is race."
Given these risks and doubts, it is no wonder that many are
reluctant to engage the topic of race or whiteness in the law school
classroom. Kevin Johnson cautions: "A teacher must be careful to
avoid missteps in the classroom. Issues of race, gender, and class
touch on individual and group identities as well as on powerful
experiences in the students' lives."'"' As noted, race is present in the
classroom before any classroom discussion occurs. Race is not only
present when students and professors enter the room, but also
pervades the law school building and its history, often evidenced by
pictures hanging on the wall or names engraved on the edifice. Racial
justice and whiteness must be analyzed as part of legal education
because of their central influence on life in the United States, its legal
system, and the practice of law.105
In the face of these obstacles, it becomes important to establish a
context for any discussion about race and whiteness, both in the
classroom and within the institution. Individual teachers can try to
shape their own classroom environment as appropriate for the class
subject matter. But faculties and administrators in legal education
have an obligation to consider methods to enable these conversations
within their institutions. Rather than waiting for a racial justice crisis,
such as hate speech directed at students of color 10 6 or a campus theme
party that insults a racial group,0 7 law schools should ensure that
104. Kevin R. Johnson, Integrating Racial Justice into the Civil Procedure Survey
Course, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 242, 245 (2004).
105. See, e.g., id. "Analysis of civil rights and racial justice issues is important to legal
education generally because those issues are central to a full understanding of U.S. social
life." Id. at 243. "[lIt is not easy to ignore the fundamental truth that race, class, and
gender influence the judicial system in the United States." Id.
106. See, e.g., Joseph Berger, Film Portrays Stifling of Speech, but One College's
Struggle Reflects a Nuanced Reality, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2007, at B7 (discussing approach
to hate speech in Vassar College campus publications); College Assesses Limits of its Free-
Speech Wall, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1996, at B6 (analyzing incident at Pomona College that
lead to rethinking the campus free-speech policy); Editorial, Hate Speech and the
University, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1995, at A30 (discussing CUNY's reaction to racist
remarks made by a professor).
107. See, e.g., Stephanie Irwin, Racism Now Hidden, UD Professor's Study Shows,
Whites' "Gangsta" Parties Seem To Follow Trend of Two-Faced Incidents Recorded in
Student's Journals, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Dayton, Ohio), Feb. 2, 2007, at Al (reporting
on an investigation into "Gangsta" theme parties thrown by white students at several U.S.
universities); Opinion, Roey Rahmil, "Hate Speech" Policies Ineffective, SANTA CLARA,
Mar. 1, 2007, at 7, available at http://media.www.thesantaclara.com/media/storage/paper
946/news/2007/03/01/Opinion/hate-Speech.Policies.Ineffective-2750808.shtm (discussing a
"South of the Border" theme party at Santa Clara University that triggered debate about
the school hate speech policy).
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channels of communication already exist for discussions about the
role of race and the role of whiteness within the legal profession. The
following sections discuss some methods for creating those
communication channels.
B. Toward Color Insight: Fostering Institutional Settings for Talking
About Race and Whiteness
The societal notion of colorblindness remains a dominant social
value in the landscape of racial dialogue. By having any conversation
about race, or about whiteness in particular, the professor works
against that dominant value. Colorblindness, however, maintains the
status quo of white privilege." 8 Given that status quo, establishing
institutions and classrooms in which these conversations can occur
productively is critical.
In many law schools, students of color form student groups based
on identity categories. Administrators often call upon these groups
and faculty of color when a racial crisis occurs within the institution."9
Many schools also have diversity or minority affairs committees that
include white faculty. Increasingly, law schools have social justice
centers that can provide a locus for the coalition work necessary to
bring groups together across racial difference to engender
conversations.10
Institutional programming about racial justice, outside of the
classroom, provides a sustained forum for discussion. Such
programming might involve a film series. Film provides a common
108. See supra notes 37-69 and accompanying text. Although white supremacy differs
from white privilege, the perpetuation of white privilege, even by inaction, maintains a
racial power imbalance.
109. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do
You Really Want To Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1222, 1226-27 (1991) (offering
reasons for people of color, hired essentially to serve as role models, to be wary of jobs as
law faculty members). Delgado writes that the job expectation includes service above and
beyond the call of duty: "Of course Tanya will agree to serve as our faculty advisor, give
this speech, serve on that panel, or agree to do us X, Y, or Z favor, probably unpaid and
on short notice. What is her purpose if not to serve us?" Id. at 1227. Furthermore: "If
you are a role model, are you expected to do the same things your white counterpart does,
in addition to counseling and helping out the community of color whenever something
comes up?" Id. Delgado observes: "Most professors of color of my acquaintance do an
inordinate amount of counseling, recruiting, and speaking on behalf of minority causes."
Id. at 1227 n.28; see also Roy L. Brooks, Life After Tenure: Can Minority Law Professors
Avoid the Clyde Ferguson Syndrome?, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 419, 419-20 (1986) (concluding
that overwork and overcommitment produce serious risk of early death for professionals
of color in high-visibility positions).
110. See, e.g., Wildman, supra note 73, at 257 n.18 (listing social justice centers).
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context for discussion."' Seeing a film with someone of a different
race can provide insights for both viewers."12
Common reading also provides a context for discussion. A
regular reading group for first-year students, facilitated by faculty,
introduces race, gender, and other identity-based issues in
conjunction with first-year courses."3  Excerpts from Kimberl6
Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy
in Legal Education,"4 and Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiography
and Legal Scholarship and Teaching: Finding the Me in the Legal
Academy," 5 make a powerful beginning to such a series.
Professor Crenshaw writes of the "anger and frustration" of
students of color in law school classrooms. 1 6  She explores the
111. For films examining this topic, see, for example, SOUL OF JUSTICE: THELTON
HENDERSON'S AMERICAN JOURNEY (Ginzberg Video Productions 2006) (providing a
personal look at racial justice issues through biography of a federal judge); MIRRORS OF
PRIVILEGE: MAKING WHITENESS VISIBLE (World Trust Education Services, Inc. 2006);
and THE COLOR OF FEAR (StirFry Seminars 1994).
112. Margalynne assigns students in her Race and the Law seminar to see films
involving race with a person of another race. Students then discuss their reactions and
present their observations to the class. This assignment deepens not only racial analysis,
but also friendship within the class.
113. The Center for Social Justice and Public Service at Santa Clara University School
of Law offers "Social Justice Thursdays." This discussion series enriches the first-year
curriculum by providing first-year law students with a forum in which to discuss public
interest/social justice issues of all kinds, alternative perspectives on legal education, and
first-year subject areas. The fall series emphasizes issues of race, ethnicity, gender, and
poverty. The spring series focuses on the role of lawyers working with communities. See
Social Justice Thursdays, http://www.scu.edu/law/socialjustice/social-justice-thursdays.cfm
(last visited Feb. 28, 2008) (describing the program and providing links to its reading lists).
114. Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Towards a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in
Legal Education, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 33 (1994) [hereinafter Crenshaw,
S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD.] (discussing her experiences teaching a seminar
entitled "Minority Voting Rights and Majoritarian Domination," designed to address
some of the difficulties encountered by minority law students). The above citation refers
to the article as reproduced by the Southern California Review of Law and Women's
Studies as part of its 1994 symposium entitled "Bringing Values and Perspectives Back
into the Law School Classroom: Practical Ideas for Teachers." Professor Crenshaw
originally wrote this article as a foreword to an issue of the National Black Law Journal.
Kimberld Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Towards a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal
Education, 11 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1 (1989).
115. Jerome McCristal Culp, Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and Teaching:
Finding the Me in the Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539 (1991) (suggesting that by
sharing their lived experiences, minority law professors create a safer space for minority
students and enhance education for students of all races). Sadly, Professor Culp died in
2005. For articles written in tribute to his legacy, see generally Robert S. Chang, A Call
from Jerome, 50 VILL. L. REV. 785 (2005); Adrienne D. Davis, Three Jeromes: A Tribute
to Professor Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., 50 VILL. L. REV. 777 (2005); and Angela P.
Harris, Tribute to Jerome: Under Construction, 50 VILL. L. REV. 775 (2005).
116. Crenshaw, S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD., supra note 114, at 34.
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"substantive dynamics of the classroom and their particular impact on
minority students." '117 She writes:
In many instances, minority students' values, beliefs, and
experiences clash not only with those of their classmates but
also with those of their professors. Yet because of the
dominant view in academe that legal analysis can be taught
without directly addressing conflicts of individual values,
experiences, and world views, these conflicts seldom, if ever,
reach the surface of the classroom discussion. Dominant beliefs
in the objectivity of legal discourse serve to suppress the
conflict by discounting the relevance of any particular
perspective in legal analysis and by positing an analytical stance
that has no specific cultural, political, or class characteristics.1 1 8
Professor Crenshaw calls this dominant mode
"perspectivelessness." 9 This theoretically neutral lack of perspective
perfectly diverts students from examining how whiteness informs
perspectivelessness. Under this view, issues of race are off limits
because they pollute objectivity. White interests, served by white
creators of legal analysis, can never be unmasked. Critiquing the
notion of perspectivelessness is crucial in talking with white students,
who often do not believe they have a racialized perspective.
Once the notion of perspectives becomes visible, the discussion
can proceed with questions like: Do you agree with Professor
Crenshaw that legal analysis incorrectly assumes perspectivelessness?
Did your own racial perspective affect how you read Professor
Crenshaw's article? If so, how? Have you experienced
perspectivelessness in your own classes or are your classes employing
a range of perspectives? Do you feel as if you need to master a
particular perspective to succeed in law school? If there is a
particular perspective, do you think that it serves principles of social
justice?
Jerome Culp, who was an African American law professor at
Duke, described his own experience of realizing that the question
posed by his students every year, "Where did you attend law school?"
was really a way of inquiring, "What qualifies you to teach me?"' °
He had not realized the question's unstated meaning until a white
117. Id.
118. Id. at 34-35 (citations omitted).
119. Id.
120. Culp, supra note 115, at 543.
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colleague was upset that students had asked Culp the question. 12'
Culp told his students that he had attended the University of Chicago
and Harvard Law School. 2 He also told them he was the son of a
coal miner, seeking to impact the way they viewed race within his
classroom. 123 Culp explained that he wanted to say "to [his] black
students that they too can engage in the struggle to reach a position of
power and influence, and to [his] white students that black people
have to struggle.' 2 4 Yet Culp found that the reaction, from students
of both races, was often disbelief.
Culp explained that his use of autobiography conveyed more
than an effort to put his students at ease about his qualifications. He
wrote that saying, "I am the son of a poor coal miner":
has informational content that has a transformative potential
much greater than my curriculum vitae. Who we are matters as
much as what we are and what we think. It is important to
teach our students that there is a "me" in the law, as well as
specific rules that are animated by our experiences.'25
Coupled with Crenshaw's exposition of perspectivelessness,
Culp's view of the importance of the "Me" in law and his memorable
message about where he came from gives students permission to
consider their own journey to law school, aspirations, and the
relationship of race to those aspirations. Fruitful discussion springs
from questions like: Why do you suppose that writers of color and
white women might feel the need to be self-consciously
autobiographical or use the "Me" as Professor Culp calls it?'26 Have
you had occasion to use the "Me" in your education prior to law
school? Was its use encouraged or discouraged? What are the
advantages of the autobiographical approach to writing, teaching, or
being a student? Does it have any dangers or risks? What do you
believe is the ideal relationship between the legal and the personal?
Do you agree with Professor Culp that the personal is also legal?
A regular institutionalized forum within the law school like
Social Justice Thursdays,2 7 where people can talk about racial justice
121. Id. The white colleague was upset because white professors do not receive similar
questions with regard to their educational background.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 539.
125. Id. at 543.
126. For more examples of an autobiographical approach, see Calmore, supra note 23;
Chang, supra note 87; and Lawrence, A Dream, supra note 93.
127. See supra note 113.
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issues within society and within the institution, provides a place
outside the classroom for students to reflect upon the learning process
in which they have become immersed. Commenting on the value of
this institutional learning environment, one student of color wrote:
Social Justice Thursdays set the context for some honest talk
about practical things we students can do to confront race and
gender issues in the classroom. It was nice to have a space
where students of color were able to have honest disagreements
and for everyone to think about what else is at stake. 128
Reading and discussing Crenshaw and Culp can help students to
become aware of their environment and perhaps to consider the legal
and social implications of diversity's absence in the historical portraits
that decorate most law schools. An introduction to writings about
perspectivelessness and autobiography cannot be a panacea, or even a
recipe, for raising whiteness issues within an institution. However,
this step can be used to foster conversation about thought processes
and to make classrooms more race-conscious, leading toward color
insight.
C. Toward Color Insight. Providing a Context for Talking About
Race and Whiteness Within a Particular Classroom
Setting a context for talking about race and whiteness will
depend both on the subject area and the size of the class, whether a
large section, Socratic-style classroom or a more intimate seminar
environment. A growing literature makes suggestions for ensuring
that discussions of racial justice issues occur within Socratic-style,
required courses.1 29 Seminar settings, with smaller numbers and often
a roundtable approach, appear more conducive to discussing race in
128. Wildman, supra note 73, at 265.
129. See, e.g., John 0. Calmore, Close Encounters of the Racial Kind: Pedagogical
Reflections and Seminar Conversations, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 903, 907 (1997) (reflecting on
teaching intended to serve the "practice of freedom"); Celestial S.D. Cassman & Lisa R.
Pruitt, A Kinder, Gentler Law School? Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Legal Education at
King Hall, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1209, 1217 (2005) (assessing the effectiveness of U.C.
Davis Martin Luther King, Jr. School of Law's attempt to shift away from the traditional
law school model in order to provide an experience that was less "hostile to students of
color and women"); Francisco Valdes, Barely at the Margins: Race and Ethnicity in Legal
Education-A Curricular Study with LatCritical Commentary, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA
L.J. 119, 122 (2002) (advocating "meaningful inclusion of new courses on, or somehow
directly relevant to, Latinas/os qua Latinas/os in the 'typical' law school curriculum of the
United States").
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general and whiteness in particular. 30 This section considers both
types of classes in turn.
1. Large Section, Socratic-Style Classrooms
Race is not a major theme in many large section courses, such as
contracts or property, as they are conventionally taught.' Similarly,
in torts, race per se is not a major issue. Race is implicated in areas
like damages awarded for injury, but the classic texts assume the
racelessness of the subject. 13 2  Creating common ground for
discussion, through the mechanism of assigned reading, is one avenue
that facilitates discussion of race and whiteness.
I [Stephanie] decided to inject a series of seven sessions, every
other week throughout the term, on theoretical perspectives on tort
law.'33  The use of perspectives not only allowed the explicit
introduction of critical race theory into the classroom, but it also
enabled utilization of other, better known perspectives, situating
critical race theory as an equal to them. Perspectives included
pragmatism, critical race theory, law and economics, feminist theory,
critical legal theory, process theory, and the practical aspects of
lawyering. 13 4
Beginning with pragmatism, utilizing the wonderful article by
Catharine Wells about situated decisionmaking'35 opens students'
eyes to the concept that who we are affects how we view the world.
Professor Wells's article examines situated decisionmaking that
requires human agency, and she explains why lawyers and judges
should develop awareness of divergent cultures.'36 She writes, "every
legal judgment is made from a particular perspective."'37 In arguing
130. Calmore, supra note 129, at 905-15.
131. See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 74, at 1-2. But see Johnson, supra note 104, at 245.
132. See, e.g., MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND
ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2001); see also Martha Chamallas, The
Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 503 (1998)
(noting that the typical law school curriculum on torts does not examine structures of
privilege).
133. For more on this idea, see Anita Bernstein, Perspectives on a Torts Course, 43 J.
LEGAL EDuC. 289 (1993). This idea developed into an introductory chapter on
perspectives in TOM GALLIGAN ET AL., TORT LAW: CASES, PERSPECTIVES, AND
PROBLEMS 4 (rev. 4th ed. 2007).
134. Certainly, other perspectives would be possible, such as corrective justice and
social justice. See GALLIGAN ET AL., supra note 133, at 10-11, 22-23.
135. Catharine Pierce Wells, Improving One's Situation: Some Pragmatic Reflections
on the Art of Judging, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 323, 323-24 (1992).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 323.
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that legal decisionmaking is inherently situated, Wells urges judges to
attend to their situation, recognizing the impossibility of being an
impersonal agent in the decisionmaking process.138 She concludes
with a plea for fair-mindedness in considering viewpoints of others.'39
With this introduction, the students are ready for the Crenshaw
and Culp readings"' that introduce critical race theory. The
Crenshaw article provides a point of reference for later conversations
engaging the questions, "Do you have a perspective in making that
argument that you are assuming as a universal? Does everyone agree
it is universal?" The Crenshaw and Culp articles provide a
vocabulary for later discussion, and they make race "officially" visible
in the classroom. Notice, although none of these articles is about
torts,14' they enrich the teaching of torts and the discussions that are
possible to conduct in class. The common texts permit reference to a
white perspective (through Crenshaw) or a white situatedness in
decisionmaking (through Wells) that would not be possible without
the background vocabulary provided by the common reading.
Constitutional law classes also provide often unused
opportunities to introduce discussions about race. Students perceive
the white supremacy embedded in the Constitution, but addressed by
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, as merely
historical. This view that the issue of privileging whiteness has been
solved eliminates a sense of urgency for examination of the
contemporary applications of white privilege that might implicate the
students and faculty themselves.
Recently I [Margalynne] have become more conscientious about
noticing when issues of race and whiteness arise in my constitutional
law course and less self-conscious about using these issues to present
a more complex understanding of substantive legal issues. For
example, while teaching about the historical context of Marbury v.
Madison,142 I used Garry Wills's book Negro President143 to explain
some of the issues that made the presidential election of 1800 so hotly
contested and the results so bitter to the Federalists. Wills contends
that Thomas Jefferson's victory depended on the additional electoral
138. Id. at 324.
139. Id. at 338.
140. See supra notes 113-128 and accompanying text (discussing Crenshaw and Culp).
141. A small portion of Culp's article does address his teaching of assault with a
racialized example, but the article is not a "torts" article in the sense of a limited subject-
matter focus. Culp, supra note 115, at 552-54.
142. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
143. GARRY WILLS, NEGRO PRESIDENT: JEFFERSON AND THE SLAVE POWER (2005).
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votes generated by the three-fifths clause, which added electoral
college votes to a state's allocation by counting three-fifths of the
state's disenfranchised slaves.'" Wills's insight into the use of the
clause gives this often-mentioned, but little understood, provision of
the Constitution real historical impact.
When teaching Gibbons v. Ogden,45 the role of slavery in the
national debate about the extent of Congress's commerce power can
be easily introduced in class by showing and discussing the videotape
"Equal Justice Under the Law: The Marshall Years: Gibbons v.
Ogden.'1 46 The video highlights the Denmark Vessey-led slave revolt
as an influential undercurrent in the states' desire to maintain control
over incoming traffic.147  These examples can easily focus on
whiteness because race is present but people of color are not party to
the disputes. Black slaves were excluded from the electorate but
served the political interests of white southerners in 1800. The
movement of free Blacks was of utmost concern to prominent Whites
who wanted to limit the federal commerce power, but the actual
subject of the Gibbons litigation was steamboat licensing. 48 White
interests were clearly the racial component of these cases rather than
the rights of non-white litigants. Looking at cases with color insight
rather than colorblindness provides a new dimension for the students
as well as for the professor.
2. The Seminar Class
The small seminar-type setting offers its own challenges for
teaching about whiteness. Seminar students have often selected the
class because of an interest in the subject area, and the small size
permits deeper exploration of issues. Yet the smaller size also
increases the potential for students to feel singled out or picked on by
other students. The professor can set a tone on the first day by
setting some ground rules to ensure a safe space for discussion. 41
144. See id. at 2 ("Though Jefferson admittedly received eight more votes than Adams
in the Electoral College, at least twelve of his votes were not based on the citizenry that
could express its will but on the blacks owned by southern masters.").
145. 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (declaring that Congress has the power to regulate
interstate commerce).
146. EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER THE LAW: THE MARSHALL YEARS: GIBBONS V.
OGDEN (Mat Von Brauchitsch WQED-Pittsburgh 1987).
147. Id.
148. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 2.
149. Ground rules can be as simple as acknowledging that students will disagree; that
indeed it would be surprising if they did not disagree, particularly about race, because of
differing perspectives. But the class will benefit from the ability to listen with respect and
to voice those disagreements in a respectful manner.
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These volatile issues are difficult to discuss in public space. Yet all
benefit from the effort, and the classroom provides space for
respectful disagreement.
Creating some common ground in student experience helps any
classroom conversation. Again, assigned reading provides key
common context. In seminars that focus on race, both authors have
prefaced discussions of whiteness with an examination of Fran
Ansley's power line analysis.15° Ansley asks the audience to imagine a
line dividing dominant characteristics and behaviors from those less
favored. The power line for identity categories such as race, gender,
and sexual orientation divides those attributes that society privileges
from those it does not. 1' Privileged attributes stand above the line
and subordinated attributes lie below it.'52 The line marks a "reality
of privilege and subordination."'53
In addition to readings, the authors have found that two color
insight exercises provide context and engender fruitful discussion:
Color Insight Exercise One (Thinking About Race) 5 4:
What is your Race? How do you know? What is your first
memory of race?
Color Insight Exercise Two (Observation Project):
Notice the racial composition of your environment for a
twenty-four hour period and record your observations. What
are the apparent races of the people you view? Note their jobs
and/or the activities in which they are engaged. Note the kinds
of interactions you observe and your position. Are you
privileged in the interaction? Where are you in relation to
Professor Fran Ansley's "power line"? Make sure that you are
in several different localities during the day (not just at home or
the law library, although time spent in these places is pertinent).
Conclude by sharing your reactions about that which you have
observed.
150. PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 11, at 29, 171.
151. Id. at 29.
152. Id. at 171.
153. Id.
154. Tanya Hernandez also discusses giving this assignment. Tanya Kateri Hernandez,
The Advantages and Disadvantages of Multiracial Versus Single-Race Focused 'Race and
the Law' Course Content: Workshop Paper for the Race and Law Curriculum Workshop
Conference, Center for the Study of Race and Race Relations, University of Florida
College of Law 7-8 (Feb. 26, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
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An example of such an exercise:
Several weeks ago, I [Stephanie] found myself stranded at
Dulles airport with a cancelled flight and eight hours until I
could depart. So I used some of the privileges I have to
walk into one of those red carpet lounges, purchase a day
pass, and settle in to work. In the eight hours I spent, I
found that all the airline employees who worked at
computers and talked with clientele were white; all the
clientele, with the exception of one African American man
(based on just my looking) were white; the bartender was
white; and all the service employees, who put out food,
cleaned it up, and cleaned the bathrooms were people of
color. I exercised my white privilege by my silence, just
doing my work. When I got on the airplane, the fasten
seatbelt sign had white hands.
The day after I came home, I went to the gym (mostly
white), where a young man, probably high school age, was
working out in a T-shirt with a collegiate Indian mascot 55
on it. I didn't know the young man, and I said nothing.
Students share their reflections with the class, deepening their own
understanding of the issues and of each other, building a classroom
atmosphere to foster further conversation.
Seminars, Socratic-style classrooms, and law schools as
institutions all provide rich opportunities for exploring whiteness.
Legal educators need to ensure that students do not encounter race
only by happenstance or believe race only affects people of color.
Rather, students should graduate and become lawyers prepared to
face the racial justice issues that pervade daily life in the United
States.
CONCLUSION
The norm of whiteness continues to permeate U.S. society. It
regenerates through the common tendency of Whites not to think
about whiteness.'56  It manifests as white privilege. The invisible
knapsack articulated by Peggy McIntosh provides an easily
155. On the offensiveness of Indian mascots, see, for example, N.C.A.A. Bans Indian
Mascots in the Postseason, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6,2005, at D6.
156. Barbara Flagg identified this habit of Whites as the "transparency phenomenon,"
naming it the defining characteristic of whiteness. Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, but Now
I See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH.
L. REV. 953, 969 (1993); see also Stephanie M. Wildman, The Persistence of White
Privilege, 18 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 245, 248-50 (2005) (further exploring how white
privilege continues).
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understandable metaphor for that privilege.157 McIntosh explains that
white privilege can be likened to "an invisible package of unearned
assets.""15  The holder of this package remains oblivious to its
presence yet can reliably depend on its contents. McIntosh continues:
"White privilege is like an invisible weightless knapsack of special
provisions, assurances, tools, maps, guides, codebooks, passports,
visas, clothes, compass, emergency gear, and blank checks." '159 White
privilege both benefits individuals and maintains systemic
subordination of non-Whites. The rhetoric of colorblindness sustains
this status quo by averting focus from racial injustice.
Color insight should displace colorblindness in order to move
this diverse nation closer to the democratic ideal of "liberty and
justice for all." Law and the legal profession should work together
with communities seeking social justice. Legal educators share a
responsibility for educating to develop color insight by teaching race
and teaching the whiteness within race in law schools and in the law
school classroom.
Teaching about whiteness by making whiteness visible embodies
John Calmore's work. He described "a white social identity that
presents itself as abstract individualism while masking its support
from systems of dominance."' 6° Thus, teaching about race in this
nation's law schools without examining whiteness does not go far
enough to challenge white authority. The legal academy must name
whiteness and make certain that how it teaches about race does not
further obscure the role that whiteness plays within law. Teaching
whiteness honors the work begun by John Calmore while moving the
legal system toward color insight.
157. Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of
Coming To See Correspondences Through Work in Women's Studies, in LESLIE BENDER
& DAAN BRAVEMAN, POWER, PRIVILEGE, AND LAW: A CIVIL RIGHTS READER 22,23
(1995).
158. Id.
159. Id. McIntosh lists "special circumstances and conditions" that she did not earn
but perceives as entitlements. Id. at 25. Her African American co-workers, friends, and
acquaintances cannot count on these same circumstances and conditions. Id.; see also
Stephanie M. Wildman, Reflections on Whiteness and Latinalo Critical Theory, 2 HARV.
LATINO L. REV. 307, 313-14 (1997) (listing circumstances and conditions that Latinos/as
cannot depend on).
160. Calmore, supra note 23, at 100-01 (addressing the difficulties of "[n]on-white
performance in a dominantly white setting").
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